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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has played a central role in 
sustaining the non-proliferation system. The effectiveness of the NPT has been secured by 
verifying its obligations through the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) that have been in place since the treaty entered into force in 1970. However, its limita-
tions came to be known through unprecedented cases which surfaced after the end of cold 
war in the early 1990s. The purpose of this article is to examine how effective the NPT has 
been in preventing nuclear proliferation by analysing the course of events through the 1990s.  
 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is defined as the process by which an entity (whether 
state, sub-national body, or person) acquires the credible means to possess, use, threaten, or 
attempt to use fissile nuclear material that could produce significant physical or radiological 
damage (most seriously in the form of an explosive device) [1]. Since 1945, the international 
nuclear non-proliferation system has maintained several instruments, such as technology con-
trols, export/import control, physical protection, measures against illicit trafficking, disarma-
ment, restraints on testing, and some special initiatives (United Nations Special Commission 
for overseeing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in Iraq, 
UNSCOM; United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC; 
and Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation, KEDO) [2]. 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) in preventing nuclear proliferation, this article examines basic characteristics of 
the NPT first and then summarises how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-
guards were strengthened in the 1990s to secure the implementation of the treaty. Lastly, it 
goes on to discuss the effectiveness of the NPT by mentioning the examples of South Africa, 
Iraq, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran. 
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
On 1 July 1968 the NPT was opened for signatories and it entered into force on 5 March 1970. 
As of January 2005, it had a membership of 188 countries [3], making it one of the largest 
existing international treaties. 
The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Article 1 provides that each Nuclear-
Weapon State (NWS) Party shall not transfer to any Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS) nucle-
ar weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and shall not assist any NNWS to manufacture 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article 2 prohibits the receipt, manufac-
ture, and/or development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. For the pur-
poses of the NPT, a NWS is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or any 
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 (Article 9 III), i.e. US, Russia, UK, France 
and China. 
Furthermore, the treaty establishes IAEA safeguards as a main measure to verify the 
fulfilment of its obligations. Each NNWS undertakes to accept the safeguards, as set forth in the 
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the 
IAEA (the “Statute”) and its safeguards system. This is for the exclusive purpose of verifying 
the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to preventing the diversion 
of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
The safeguards required by this Article are to be applied on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, 
or carried out under its control (Article 3 I).  
Pursuant to Article 10 II, in May 1995, twenty-five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty, the NPT Review and Extension Conference was held and adopted the indefinite 
extension of the NPT.  
IAEA safeguards 
Before the NPT 
Soon after World War II, the international community turned its eye to setting up an interna-
tional atomic energy organisation with the authority to make world-wide inspections. This idea 
fell in line with the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the American Baruch draft, 
the Russian Gromyko draft, and a speech entitled ‘Atoms for Peace’ made by then American 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The idea of the IAEA was presented to the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) in 1953. Further arguments led to the adoption of the Statute of the 
IAEA, including safeguard provisions, during the tenth UNGA on the 23rd of October, 1956. 
The Statute came into effect on the 29th of July 1957, thereby establishing the IAEA. 
Article 2 of the Statute provides that the IAEA shall ensure, so far as it is able, that 
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in 
such way as to further any military purpose. For this reason, Article 3 V establishes safeguards 
to ensure that nuclear materials are not used in such a way as to further military purposes. 
Article 12 provides the IAEA’s rights and responsibilities in applying safeguards, remedial 
actions to any non-compliance or failure if any, a right to report any non-compliance to the 
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UNGA and the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) as well as corresponding 
sanctions. 
In reality, even after the IAEA was established, setting the safeguard procedures in accor-
dance with these provisions progressed at a snail’s pace. This could be attributed to the fact 
that no state requested the IAEA to apply its safeguards. Most states sought for bilateral agree-
ments that provided for not only the supply of nuclear materials and facilities but also bilateral 
safeguards, following the American model of refusing mediation by an international organi-
sation for fear of nuclear proliferation resulting from peaceful nuclear activities, although the 
US was both the first advocate of the IAEA and the main actor in global nuclear activities.  
The first State that requested inspection by the IAEA was Japan. Although poor in natural 
energy resources, Japan had to cope with increasing demands for electricity as a result of rapid 
economic growth and thus turned its attention to nuclear power generation. However, due to 
political concerns, it decided to accept inspections by an international organisation rather than 
establish a bilateral relationship with specific States such as the United States or the United 
Kingdom [4]. One of the reasons for Japan’s initiative was the international circumstances of 
the time: among the many States that launched massive nuclear power generation projects, US, 
UK, USSR, and France were not obliged to accept inspections as being NWSs, while many 
European countries such as West Germany and Italy hoped for inspections by the EURATOM. 
The Board of Governors of the IAEA (BOG) adopted the first safeguard agreement 
INFCIRC/26 in January 1961, then INFCIRC/26/Add.1 in February 1964, followed by a new do-
cument INFCIRC/66 in 1965. From this point, safeguards which had been applied according to 
bilateral agreements were to be gradually placed under the control of the IAEA.  
Safeguards required in connection with the NPT 
INFCIRC/66-type safeguard agreements leave a broad scope of practical decisions to the IAEA 
as well as to the discretion of its inspectors. The agreement does not strictly define its target 
nor the inspectors’ duty to maintain confidentiality, while allowing a broad frequency of in-
spections. The NPT came into force on the eve of large-scale nuclear power generation, when 
states such as Japan and West Germany, which had high expectations of nuclear power genera-
tion, strongly feared that NWSs would abuse the safeguard system to infringe industrial secrets. 
Thus, those states claimed to revise INFCIRC/66 as soon as it became clear that the NPT applied 
IAEA safeguards. Hence, the revision put an emphasis on not inflicting a loss on the technolo-
gical and economic aspects of NNWSs, while maintaining its original function of non-prolifera-
tion [5]. Article 4 of the NPT, which provides inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peace-
ful purposes, was the strength of this argument. 
Consequently, in March 1971, the ‘Structure and Content of Agreements between the 
agency and States required in connection with the treaty of the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons’ (INFCIRC/153) was adopted. According to INFCIRC/153 (Paragraph 1), inspections 
are applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. How-
ever, in practice the frequency of inspections is based upon the quantity of nuclear material 
each state possesses. Therefore, it targeted mainly industrialised NNWSs such as western Euro-
pean countries, Japan and Canada.  
Meanwhile, the five NWSs concluded voluntary offer agreements (VOA) with the IAEA to 
accept its safeguards. A VOA is usually an INFCIRC/153-type agreement, but what form it takes 
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is ultimately up to each individual state. As stated above, the NPT system was settled by gaining 
verification measures to secure its implementation under an international organisation, the 
IAEA. As of 1991, 180 safeguard agreements had been concluded between the IAEA and 105 
countries. 
Strengthened safeguards 
Controversial points of INFCIRC/153 
As mentioned above, the implementation of the NPT is secured by the IAEA according to 
INFCIRC/153-type agreements, but INFIRC/153 has two major controversial points. 
Firstly, the IAEA was not designed to be an organisation for verification of the NPT, so that 
the objectives of the NPT are not always consistent with those of the IAEA. As a result, there 
are some variations between the scope of the NPT and that of the IAEA safeguards. In reality, 
the IAEA cannot work on the verification of the receipt of nuclear weapons among the duties 
imposed on NNWSs as provided in Article 2 of the NPT. Also, whereas the NPT aims to prevent 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in general (NPT Article 1 
and 2), the IAEA aims solely to prevent nuclear energy from being diverted to ‘any military 
purpose’ (the Statute Article 2). This means that the NPT requires verification of not only 
nuclear materials for peaceful purposes but also military not-nuclear-explosive devices (e.g., 
nuclear fuel for nuclear-powered submarines), while at the same time the application of IAEA 
safeguards is limited to nuclear materials used exclusively for peaceful purposes [6]. 
The other point is that the provisions require the safeguards to be applied on ‘all source or 
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities’ (NPT Article 3, INFCIRC/153 Para-
graph 2), whereas in practice the safeguards are applied only on nuclear materials ‘declared’ 
voluntarily by each State.  
The above mentioned points have been pointed out with regard to INFCIRC/153. How-
ever, it was only after issues in Iraq and the DPRK occurred in the 1990s when its revisions 
were accelerated. Details of these cases are given below.  
Practice of special inspection 
A special inspection (INFCIRC/153 Paragraph 73 and 77) is an inspection designed to examine 
reports from a concerned State or to fulfill responsibilities of the IAEA in the event or suspi-
cion of abnormal situations, apart from routine inspections [7]. There have been indications 
for some time that utilising special inspections is necessary. However, these indications have 
been unsuccessful because none has ever been done. It was not until after it was revealed that 
Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons in 1991 that the IAEA started a full-scale review of the 
special inspection provision. 
Later, in November 1991, the IAEA Secretariat prepared a paper on strengthening the 
IAEA safeguards GOV/2554?to be reviewed at the BOG in February 1992. The BOG ‘reaf-
firmed the IAEA’s right to undertake special inspection in Member States with comprehensive 
safeguards agreements, when necessary and appropriate, and to ensure that all nuclear materials 
in peaceful nuclear activities are under safeguards’. It further ‘reaffirmed the IAEA’s right to 
obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with its Statute 
and all comprehensive safeguards agreements’ [8]. 
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Here, provisional terms ‘in agreement with the State’ (Paragraph 77) raise a controversy 
about whether the State Party which concludes a INFCIRC/153-type safeguard agreement has 
an obligation to accept the special inspection, or whether it allows the State to refuse the 
special inspection. 
This point is not clarified in the paper on strengthening the IAEA safeguards (GOV/2554), 
and there is an argument to be made for the obligation of accepting special inspections [9]. 
However, Article 12 C of the Statute provides that the BOG ‘shall’ report the non-compliance 
to all members, the UNSC, and the UNGA [10], while Paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 provides 
that the BOG ‘may’ make the reports. From these terms, it follows that it is possible for the 
BOG not to report non-compliance even when a State Party refuses to accept the special 
inspection, meaning that refusing special inspections does not always equal non-compliance. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is no obligation to accept special inspections.  
Taking account of the fact that the BOG is entitled to decide whether or not to report each 
individual case, it was not unreasonable for the BOG to reaffirm its rights to implement special 
inspections in February 1992.  
Improving the reporting system 
Although the right to implement special inspections was reaffirmed as above, questions still 
remain about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards if the IAEA is given insufficient information 
on undeclared nuclear activities. To secure information that can help finding undeclared 
nuclear activities, the IAEA has also improved the reporting system related to its safeguards. 
Firstly, early submission by states of design information with respect to nuclear facilities 
was debated. INFCIRC/153 stipulates that design information of nuclear facilities shall be pro-
vided ‘as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility’ (Paragraph 
42), but does not give specific time limits. Thus, the BOG on February 1992, which reaffirmed 
the right of special inspection, stated that design information on new facilities and on changes 
to existing facilities shall be provided to the IAEA as soon as possible.  
Secondly, the BOG of February 1993 adopted a Universal Reporting System. Under this 
system, each member state provides voluntary information on the import/export of nuclear 
materials, specified nuclear related equipment, and non-nuclear materials to the IAEA. It covers 
a wider scope than INFCIRC/153 as it encourages member states to provide relevant informa-
tion on specified ‘equipment and non-nuclear materials’, not just specific nuclear materials. 
As the system equally encourages NNWSs, which concluded INFCIRC/153-type safeguard 
agreements, and NWSs, which concluded the VOA, to voluntarily provide information it enabled 
the IAEA to have a much clearer view of the global flow of nuclear-related equipment and thus 
enlarged the possibility of detecting undeclared nuclear activities, by providing a chance for the 
comparison and analysis of the flow.  
Programme 93+2 
The IAEA Secretariat recognised the need for a comprehensive and systematic approach to 
strengthen its safeguards in the course of discussions triggered by the issues in Iraq and the 
DPRK in the early 1990s and proposed ‘Programme 93+2’ to the BOG in December 1993. For 
the next two years, it worked to assemble a proposal on ‘Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS)’ 
[11]. 
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This system was worked out in two separate parts: part one examines various available 
actions under the authorisation of the current INFCIRC/153-type safeguard agreements; and 
part two examines other actions that would be available only if additional legal authority was 
given to the IAEA. Part one was approved by the BOG in June 1995 to be implemented in 1996 
[12]. 
Features of part one include obtaining further information, enhancing on-site inspection 
and adapting existing systems to improve efficiency. To obtain further information, part one 
proposes the early submission of design information on nuclear facilities, as mentioned above, 
while stretching its objective to encompass information on nuclear activities prior to the entry 
into force of safeguard agreements, the status of nuclear fuel cycles, and the operational condi-
tions of nuclear facilities. In regard to on-site inspections, part one enabled inspections on 
uranium processing plants, nuclear power stations, and other related facilities without advance 
notice other than sites which indicated that nuclear material was present as provided for by 
INFCIRC/153. Part one also proposed procedural improvements including simplifying the pro-
cedures of appointing inspectors and permitting multi-visas for more flexible and efficient in-
spections. 
Additional protocol INFCIRC/540 
Part two of the SSS was transformed into a different proposal by the Secretariat, after part one 
was implemented. After careful discussions within the BOG’s drafting committee, a special BOG 
session adopted the ‘Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the 
IAEA for the Application of Safeguards’ (INFCIRC/540) by consensus on 15 May 1997 [12]. 
The new measures contemplated by INFCIRC/540 are of three general types: information 
related, access related, and those related to administrative arrangements. For all of these 
measures, INFCIRC/540 dared to stretch their range or enhance their implementation. It is 
especially noticeable that access to related sites including places where nuclear material is not 
present was permitted, as it allowed complementary access to undeclared nuclear activities 
(Article 5) [14]. 
INFCIRC/540 is distinct from both the NPT and INFCIRC/153 as it requires both NNWSs 
and NWSs which have NPT membership to apply, whereas the NPT places only NNWSs under an 
obligation to conclude safeguard agreements [15]. As of August 2003, it was signed by 74 states 
and entered into force in 35 states and EURATOM. It is expected that INFCIRC/540 will bring 
improved transparency of each state’s nuclear activities, increasing the accuracy and 
completeness of IAEA safeguards in future.  
Integrated safeguards 
Integrated Safeguards are defined as the optimum combination of all safeguard measures avail-
able to the IAEA under INFCIRC/153-type safeguard agreements and additional protocols to it 
(INFCIRC/540). These safeguards achieve the maximum effectiveness and efficiency within 
available resources in fulfilling the IAEA’s right and obligation in paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 
[16]. 
Integrated safeguards shall be implemented in a State only when the IAEA has drawn the 
conclusion that there is an absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in that State, 
and only after taking IAEA safeguards under an INFCIRC/153-type safeguard agreement and its 
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additional protocols. Furthermore, under integrated safeguards, safeguarding measures may be 
applied at reduced levels at certain facilities, compared with the measures that would have been 
applied without this conclusion. 
Traditional INFCIRC/153-type safeguard agreements in practice focused solely on the 
quantity of nuclear materials possessed by each State and left little room for independent 
decisions by the IAEA. On the contrary, under the integrated safeguards system, the IAEA can 
make independent decisions based solely on its past experience. Research and developments 
are being made towards the speedy realisation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA General 
Conference (GC) has supported the Secretariat’s challenge to strengthen the effectiveness and 
improve the efficiency of safeguards ever since it commenced. It had also urged the Secretariat 
to continue studying integrated safeguards in the context of implementation since 2000 [17]. 
If applied with integrated safeguards, states could enjoy more international credibility and 
benefits from nuclear activities as a result of decreased costs for conventional safeguards. This 
means the NPT and IAEA safeguards could step forward into a new era. 
Case studies 
South Africa 
Discovery of a uranium mine in the suburb of Johannesburg in 1944 led the South African 
government to enact the Atomic Energy Act and establish the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) 
[18] in 1948. Since then, South Africa has become a forerunner in the field of nuclear studies 
backed by its abundant uranium resources. With the establishment of the IAEA in 1957, it was 
listed as one of the original member states, and had also concluded INFCIRC/66-type safeguard 
agreements with the IAEA in which it had transferred bilateral safeguard systems to the IAEA.  
In the mid 1970s, South Africa started nuclear development from political necessity. In 
1975, Angola, which is adjacent to Namibia, and Mozambique, border countries to South 
Africa, gained independence from Portugal. In both Angola and Mozambique, civil war broke 
out between pro-USSR governments and anti-government guerrilla groups, and South Africa 
interfered in these civil wars by supporting guerrilla groups from fears that communism would 
raise its head in Southern African countries. Suffering from the influences of the cold war and 
domestic power struggles in South Africa, Angola turned into a fierce battlefield in the end and 
the Cuban army was deployed to help its government. Such a situation was said to be a direct 
factor in South Africa rushing to develop nuclear weapons. 
After the USSR pointed out South Africa’s nuclear development in 1977, followed by 
similar indications from the US in 1979, the UNGA of December 1982 requested that South 
Africa stop nuclear development and place all of its nuclear activities under the control of the 
IAEA safeguards. At the same time, the UNGA requested that the IAEA suspend all assistance to 
South Africa on nuclear activities [19]. In June 1987, pursuant to Article 19 B of the Statute, 
the BOG submitted a recommendation to suspend South African privileges and rights of 
membership as a member state of the IAEA to the General Conference (GC). However, the GC 
of September 1987 postponed this subject for one year as South Africa was considering 
changing its policy on nuclear activities and joining the NPT in the near future. The issue was 
revisited many times by the GC in an effort to see the Cold War end [20], and on 10 July 1991 
South Africa acceded to the NPT as a NNWS and concluded an INFCIRC/153-type safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA on the 16th of September. For verification of the initial report South 
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Africa submitted to the IAEA pursuant to the agreement, South Africa was keen to co-operate 
with the IAEA in accepting access to ‘any place, any time’, including enrichment facilities, which 
had been missing from prior safeguards [21]. 
On 24 March 1993, then South African president Frederik Willem de Klerk announced 
that his government had developed six nuclear weapons in the past but had destroyed all of 
them. The information was later verified by IAEA inspectors who had been invited by the 
South African government [22]. 
It may be reasonable to conclude that South Africa abandoned nuclear development be-
cause security concerns vanished at the end of the Cold War. In any event, what transpired was 
that a strong political leadership took the initiative to rejoin the international community and 
achieve economic development by restoring its international credibility through membership 
with the NPT. It symbolises the raison d’être of the NPT system in the international community. 
Consequently, South Africa became the one and only state to abandon nuclear weapons 
voluntarily and played a key role in supporting the indefinite extension of the NPT at the NPT 
Review and Extension Conference in 1995. 
Iraq 
UNSCOM 
Following the Iraqi invasion of its neighbouring country Kuwait in August 1990, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 660 which demanded immediate and unconditional withdrawal. When Iraq 
failed to comply with this resolution, the Multinational Coalition Force attacked Iraq in January 
1991, otherwise known as the Gulf War. The end of the Gulf War was declared by UNSC 
Resolution 687 on 3 April, which demanded that Iraq reaffirm its obligations under the NPT, 
place its fissionable materials under the exclusive control of the IAEA, accept IAEA inspections 
to verify the destruction of the materials stated above, and permit inspections and monitoring 
for extended periods, all of which Iraq accepted officially. Following this resolution, the UNSC 
established the United Nations Special Commission for overseeing the elimination of weapons 
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in Iraq (the UNSCOM) on 1 May 1991 to inspect and 
eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The resolution also called upon the IAEA to 
carry out inspections of Iraqi nuclear weapons under the assistance and co-operation of 
UNSCOM. Places to be inspected by the IAEA were identified based on sites that Iraq indicated 
in the report submitted in accordance with Resolution 687 and sites which UNSCOM chose 
based on other information. The IAEA inspectors were guaranteed to have unconditional and 
unlimited access to any region, facility, equipment, record and means of transportation [23]. 
UNSCOM’s extensive and intensive inspections discovered Iraq’s nuclear development 
programme later on. The fact that nuclear development projects had been carried out in an 
undeclared facility in the same premises where the IAEA had made routine inspections 
according to an INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement in connection with the NPT between 
Iraq and the IAEA (INFCIRC/172; entered into force on 29 February 1972) without there having 
been official non-compliance records prior to that time, had a great impact on the IAEA. This 
case unearthed questions over the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, which depend on declara-
tions from a State. 
On this point, then IAEA Director General Hans Blix proposed that this arrangement 
raises concerns about the scope and effectiveness of current non-proliferation control [24]. 
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Meanwhile, UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus called for more efforts by the IAEA to make special 
inspection of undeclared facilities, to gather more information from governments, and to work 
more closely with the UNSC. Mr. Ekeus also expected that the UNSC could play a vital role in 
comprehensive non-proliferation [25]. 
UNMOVIC 
While the IAEA began to strengthen its safeguard system after this incident as mentioned 
above, Iraq announced in October 1997 that it would no longer co-operate with UNSCOM and 
in October 1998 decided to suspend all assistance to UNSCOM. Following this move, the UNSC 
(with full assent) adopted Resolution 1205 on 5 November 1998 which held Iraq non-co-
operative and called for resumed co-operation on inspections. Although Iraq temporarily 
declared the unconditioned acceptance of inspections, it remained unco-operative. Thus, in 
December 1997, the US and UK bombed Iraq on a scale not seen since the Gulf War because 
Iraq’s co-operation with inspections was insufficient. This forced UNSCOM to suspend its mon-
itoring and verification operations and close down its office in Iraq. 
To break the standstill, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1284 on 17 December 1997 which 
established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMO-
VIC). UNMOVIC replaced UNSCOM and aimed to establish and implement a strengthened system 
of continuous monitoring and verification in Iraq. Although preparations for inspection were 
continuously pushed forward with former IAEA Director General Hans Blix taking office as 
Chief of UNMOVIC on 1 March 2000 and an organisational plan for UNMOVIC being adopted 
by the UNSC on 13 April, no inspections were made in Iraq because it had not agreed to accept 
inspections. 
On 8 November 2002, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1441 giving Iraq a ‘last chance’ to 
implement its obligation to disarm. The resolution stated that UNMOVIC and IAEA should make 
inspections of chemical/biological weapons/missiles and nuclear development programmes 
respectively, giving them drastically improved authority for instant, unconditional and unlim-
ited access to various sites including the president’s facilities. As Iraq announced that it would 
accept the resolution on 13 November, IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors resumed their activities 
on 27 November which eventually extended to include the whole country. However, as the US 
began bombing Iraq in March 2003, such inspections were suspended four months after 
resumption.  
On 15 October 2003, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1511 on post-war reconstruction of 
Iraq by common assent, and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urged the resumption 
of inspections the next day [26]. 
IAEA and the UNSC in Iraq’s case 
In this case, the IAEA worked closely with UNSCOM and UNMOVIC in the verification of nuclear 
weapons in Iraq under UNSC resolutions arising from Iraq’s violations of international law by 
invading Kuwait. Since the verification was not based on a INFCIRC/153-type safeguards 
agreement but on related UNSC Resolutions, it had far greater authority than that under the 
agreement, and helped inspectors to detect previously undetected nuclear weapons program-
mes in Iraq.  
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Some have jumped to the conclusion that this case indicates the limits of IAEA safeguards 
and the entire NPT system, but we must take into consideration that most likely it was 
impossible to conclude a safeguards agreement between the IAEA and Iraq that would have 
allowed the same level of authority for the IAEA as was given by UNSC Resolutions. Therefore, 
it is not realistic to evaluate IAEA verification measures generally based on this case, in which 
verification was carried out under the authority of the UNSC.  
What should be stressed here is the benefit gained from the close relationship between the 
IAEA and the UNSC. The NPT entrusts its verification to the IAEA, in part due to its close rela-
tionship with the UNSC, making it possible to improve its verification system with other IAEA 
activities under the UNSC (although as a result). As mentioned above, the IAEA made several 
attempts to strengthen its safeguard system hereafter these events with Iraq.  
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
NPT withdrawal in 1993 
On the 12th of December 1985 the DPRK became a party to the NPT. On the 30th of January 
1992 it signed an INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403), which entered into 
force on the 10th of April, with the end of the Cold War and the Declaration on the Denucle-
arisation of the Korean Peninsula as its backdrop [27]. The IAEA began inspections to verify 
the DPRK’s initial report and found inconsistencies between its findings and the DPRK’s decla-
rations [28]. In parallel with the request for a special inspection in the DPRK on the 9th of 
February 1993, the special BOG adopted Resolution 2636 calling upon the DPRK for full co-
operation with the IAEA [29]. However, the DPRK refused a special inspection to specified fa-
cilities claiming them to be non-nuclear military facilities, and on the 12th of March the DPRK 
announced its withdrawal from the NPT pursuant to Article 10 [30]. 
The BOG of the 18th of March adopted Resolution 2639 [31] which affirmed that the safe-
guards agreement between the IAEA and the DPRK remained in force and requested the Direc-
tor General to continue efforts and talks. However, on the 1st of April, Resolution 2645 [32] 
was adopted which concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with the safeguards agree-
ment. This resolution also directed that a report of the DPRK’s non-compliance and its failure 
to verify the non-diversion of nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards would be made to all 
member states, the UNSC, and the UNGA, in accordance with the Statute 12 C and Article 19 of 
INFCIRC/403. In line with this decision, the IAEA submitted a Director General’s detailed 
report on the DPRK’s non-compliance to the United Nations [33]. 
Following the submission of this report, the UNSC adopted Resolution 825 on the 11th of 
May, calling upon the DPRK to reconsider its withdrawal from the NPT and to comply with the 
safeguard agreement. Shortly after this, the US began bilateral talks with the DPRK beginning in 
June 1993. Due to these attempts, the DPRK suspended its withdrawal from the NPT on the 
11th of June, a day before the scheduled date of its entry into force, under the condition that it 
would determine the scope of IAEA inspections in the future through DRPK-US talks. This 
condition was based on the DPRK’s claim that it stood in ‘unique status’ because of the 
suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT, and thus IAEA inspections in the DPRK are not 
completed according to the safeguards agreement [34]. 
The IAEA continued talks with the DPRK in order to carry out inspections, but to no 
satisfactory extent [35]. Then in May 1994, concerns once again arose as the DPRK started to 
 Recent developments in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons            97 
 
 
 
draw fuels out of its nuclear reactor. Soon after this on the 10th of June 1994, the BOG 
concluded that the DPRK continued to widen its non-compliance with the safeguards 
agreement and called upon the DPRK to co-operate with the IAEA urgently and fully. It also 
adopted a Resolution to suspend all non-medical technical assistance to the DPRK in 
accordance with the Statute Article 12 C [36]. This was the first time the IAEA applied sanc-
tions [37]. On the 13th of June 1994 the DPRK announced its immediate withdrawal from the 
IAEA (Statute Article 18) [38]. 
NPT withdrawal in 2003 
In October 1994, negotiations between the US and the DPRK let to the ‘Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea-United States of America: Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of 
the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula’ (21 October 1994). Under this framework the 
DPRK was set to freeze and dismantle its nuclear reactors and other related facilities under IAEA 
monitoring in exchange for light-water reactors and alternative energy resources available until 
the reactor was built. With regard to the NPT, the Agreed Framework stipulated that the DPRK 
retain its membership in the NPT and accepted the implementation of safeguards agreements 
with the IAEA. However, it also provided that instead of being required to immediately comply 
with the safeguards agreement, the DPRK were to be given time to come into full compliance 
with the agreement before the key nuclear components were delivered to the site, once the 
main section of the project had been completed.  
On the 9th of March 1995 Japan, the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK) signed an agree-
ment establishing the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) to support 
the project. A Supply Agreement was concluded on the 12th of December 1995 to kick off the 
KEDO project, allowing a resumption of IAEA safeguards in the DPRK’s nuclear facilities which 
were not frozen or dismantled. 
In reality, however, delays in compliance with the US-DPRK Agreed Framework prevented 
IAEA inspections. In January, when US President Bush took office, the US revised its DPRK 
policies and put an end to the bilateral relationship between the US and the DPRK. In President 
Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002 he referred to the DPRK, Iraq and Iran as 
‘the axis of evil’, making the situation much worse. 
Bilateral talks were resumed in October 2002, during which the DPRK allegedly acknowl-
edged that it had a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, instead of plutonium 
which had been frozen under the Agreed Framework [39]. Subsequently, on the 26th of Octo-
ber 2002, Japan, the US and the ROK announced a joint communiqué concluding the DPRK’s 
programme infringed the NPT, the IAEA safeguards agreement and the US-DPRK Agreed Frame-
work [40]. Then in November 2002 the BOG urged the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons 
programme [41]. At the same time the KEDO Board decided to suspend the supply of heavy oil 
beginning in December.  
The DPRK asserted the US had unilaterally made the claim that the DPRK had acknowl-
edged it had a nuclear programme. The DPRK then announced the freezes on its nuclear facili-
ties were lifted pursuant to the US-DPRK Agreed Framework in light of KEDO’s suspension of 
the heavy fuel oil supply [42]. This was followed by an order calling on IAEA inspectors, who 
were in charge of monitoring in the DPRK, to leave the country. At the end of December 2002, 
IAEA inspectors left the DPRK. After the BOG of January 2003 a resolution was adopted criticis-
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ing the DPRK in the strongest of terms [43]. The DPRK again announced its withdrawal from 
the NPT on the 10th of January 2003 (NPT Article 10 I). With no outstanding progress in nego-
tiations, the KEDO Board decided to temporarily suspend the KEDO project for one year’s time 
on the 4th of November 2003. 
IAEA and the UNSC on DPRK 
The DPRK’s non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement triggered its withdrawal from 
the NPT, followed by bilateral negotiations between the US and the DPRK and then the estab-
lishment of KEDO. It was also the first time for the IAEA to request a special inspection, which 
was affirmed in February 1992 during its standstill in Iraq. However, this request was denied by 
the DPRK and actually drove the DPRK out of the NPT in the end. The IAEA started working 
closely with the UNSC after this event, but with the IAEA’s first sanction the DPRK announced 
its withdrawal from the IAEA as well. The DPRK’s current legal status under the NPT is not clear 
and still invokes various arguments [44]. It also serves to raise new issues concerning the 
effectiveness of the NPT. 
Although the IAEA sanctions were insufficient in this case, it is fair to conclude that the 
IAEA fulfilled its responsibilities by reporting the DPRK’s non-compliance to the UNSC and by 
dealing with the issue in close co-operation with the UNSC. Issues beyond this point should be 
recognised as belonging to the UNSC.  
The DPRK’s decision to withdraw from the NPT has nothing to do with the effectiveness 
of the NPT, since any state is entitled to withdraw from any treaty. Any treaty that has the 
membership of almost all states in the world can be recognised as customary international law, 
thus binding even non-member states. However, treaties to which some states are persistently 
and continuously opposed do not receive this same type of recognition. It is especially so when 
a state with important interests in the subject matter of the treaty is opposed. Based on the fact 
that international peace and security has been recognised as the core of customary international 
law, one might say that nuclear proliferation violates customary law. However, considering the 
peculiarity of the NPT, which provides different obligations on NWSs and NNWSs respectively, 
the criticism that the NPT is an unequal treaty due to this peculiarity, and opposition from India 
and Pakistan, it is still too early to conclude that the provisions of the NPT form a part of 
customary international law.  
The situation with the DPRK highlighted the importance of co-operation between the IAEA 
as a verification organisation of the NPT and the UNSC in terms of resolving conflicts. How-
ever, it should also be seen as a challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation system, which is 
centred around the NPT and not as a challenge to the effectiveness of the NPT.  
Iran 
Iran gained membership in the IAEA in 1958, signed the NPT on the 1st of July 1968, and 
ratified it on the 2nd of February 1970. Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, in connec-
tion with the NPT, entered into force on the 17th of May 1974 [45]. 
In August 2002, an Iranian anti-governmental organisation announced that the Iranian 
regime had a nuclear weapons programme [46]. This sparked much controversy that continues 
to this day. At the IAEA GC held in September 2002, Iran announced that it was planning on 
constructing nuclear facilities twenty years hence, emphasising they would be used for peaceful 
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purposes and denying any existence of nuclear weapons programmes. However, undeclared 
imports of related materials and construction plans for previously unknown nuclear facilities 
[47] were revealed leading the BOG of June 2003 to urge Iran to submit accurate information 
under the safeguards agreement [48]. The IAEA has issued the same requests calling for the 
implementation of the safeguards agreement. 
After concluding that Iran’s report was unsatisfactory, the GC of September 2003 called 
upon Iran to take all necessary steps to show its compliance with the safeguards agreement by 
the end of October 2003. The GC also requested that Iran suspend the enrichment of uranium 
and sign an additional protocol to secure transparency in regards to its nuclear programme 
[49]. Although Iran stressed that it did not renounce the right to enrich uranium, it announced 
that uranium enrichment would be suspended, signed an additional protocol, and stated it 
would act in full co-operation with the IAEA in implementing the safeguards agreement on the 
21st of October 2003. On the 23rd of October 2003 Iran submitted a report on its nuclear 
programmes and on the 10th of November 2003 it officially announced the suspension of 
uranium enrichment and the acceptance of the additional protocol, emphasising again that it 
had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. It is stated that the report clearly indicated 
Iran’s non-compliance with the safeguard agreement, but this remains unclear. 
Issues in Iran are centred on its non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreement in 
connection with the NPT, as in the case of the DPRK. While IAEA inspection under the safe-
guards agreement revealed unknown nuclear activities in the DPRK, in Iran the IAEA took ac-
tions after the suspicion was aroused by a third party and spread through the media.  
As stated above, IAEA safeguards are, in principle, based on information declared by the 
state party. Complementary inspection authority in regards to undeclared activities is granted to 
the IAEA only under the Additional Protocol. Therefore, if a state party in which the Additional 
Protocol is not entered into force submits unsatisfactory reports, as in Iran’s case, the IAEA has 
no option but to persistently negotiate with the state while following normal procedures, such 
as calling for the BOG and the GC to adopt requests or report to the UNSC. The future of this 
case is still unknown, but it is time to discuss an international framework for the IAEA which 
would allow it to collect more objective information if the aim is to improve the effectiveness 
of the NPT [50]. 
Conclusion 
As discussed above, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s led to a situation in which the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons came to affect more than a limited number of industrial-
ised nations. Since then, the NPT has been frequently questioned in terms of its effectiveness. 
The South African case indicates that the mere existence of the NPT has some significance. 
South Africa launched a nuclear weapons programme under the influence of the Cold War, 
subsequently abandoned its programme voluntarily, and sought membership of the NPT in 
order to build confidence in the international community. Also, through the cases in Iraq and 
the DPRK, IAEA safeguards have been improved by strengthening connections between the 
UNSC and the IAEA, the verification organisation of the NPT. Along with the IAEA, which is 
looking to strengthen its safeguard measures through Additional Protocols being adopted in 
more countries while searching for more effective and efficient safeguards through integrated 
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safeguards, the NPT remains effective with possibilities of becoming even more effective in the 
future. 
One of the pressing questions for the NPT is not its verification measures but the means 
of withdrawal as chosen by the DPRK. It is not the NPT’s failure but rather the failure of the 
whole nuclear non-proliferation system that India, Pakistan and Israel – which is claimed to 
have nuclear weapons – do not have NPT membership. However, withdrawal from the NPT by 
any member state must be avoided since such a move virtually deprives the NPT of its material 
effectiveness irregardless of how effective it might formally be. 
The indefinite extension of the NPT decided in the NPT Revision Conference held in 1995 
in accordance with the NPT Article 10 II symbolises its huge membership and the expectations 
about the NPT, although the decision did not accept the current situation. Most of the discus-
sion fell upon the negotiations for nuclear disarmament centred on Article 6, which provides 
that each of the Parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control [51]. It is essential for NWSs to pursue negotiations both in good faith and to maintain 
voluntarily practical effectiveness of the NPT in the future, encompassing the criticism that it is 
substantially an unequal treaty by dividing between NWSs and NNWSs. 
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